The received literature on the use of resale price restraints has produced results that show that RPM may be anti-competitive and lead to increased prices to consumers, but also that RPM may be bene…cial because it may induce more retail sales e¤ort. These results have been derived either in models with secret contracts and no retail sales e¤ort, or with public contracts and where retail sales e¤ort are important. In most real life markets retail sales e¤ort are at least of some importance, and contracts are secret. In this paper we propose a unifying approach where both these central ingredients are present. We show that purely bilateral price restraints, irrespective of type, have no implication whatsoever on the equilibrium outcome.
Introduction
Resale price maintenance (RPM), i.e. the practice that manufacturers limits the freedom of its retailers to determine resale prices, is much debated in the economic literature and in policy circles. Until recently both competition authorities and courts in both EU and US frowned at the practice, but after the so-called Leegin-case, US has adopted a softer approach 1 . In general, competition policy in many countries tends to be more hostile against minimum of …xed resale restrictions than when the restraint is a maximum RPM. In fact, in most jurisdictions maximum RPM is regarded as unproblematic from a competition policy perspective. The predictions from the economic literature on RPM are confusing and partly con ‡icting. As usual with vertical restraints there are models that show that the use of RPM may be anti-competitive as it will raise prices, and others that claim that the use of RPM may be e¢ ciency enhancing because it fosters value creating retail services.
In the economic literature both the anti-competitive and the e¢ ciency arguments for RPM have been analysed, and basically within two broad classes of models. There are some models assume that contracts o¤ered by manufacturers to its retailers are public (e.g. Innes and Hamilton, 2009; Gabrielsen and Johansen, 2013; Rey and Vergé, 2010; Mathewson and Winter, 1984) and other were retail contracts are secret (e.g. O'Brien and Sha¤er, 1992; Rey and Vergé, 2004; Montez, 2012) . In addition, the models developed in the economic literature di¤er with respect to the importance of retail sales e¤ort for consumer demand and to the extent that there are externalities between retailers in e¤ort provision.
The tension between di¤erent views on RPM can be illustrated by O'Brien and Sha¤er (1992) (OS) and Mathewson and Winter (1984) (MW) . OS show that RPM may be used by an upstream monopolist to remonopolize the market by allowing the monopolist to escape from an opportunism problem 2 arising from secret contracting with competing downstream retailers. Absent RPM the manufacturer is unable to avoid the temptation to o¤er each individual retailer a sweetheart deal in order to free-ride on the margins of competing retailers, and ends up losing all his market power. The solution proposed by OS is to o¤er each retailer a maximum resale price and then squeeze retail margins with a high wholesale price. This will eliminate retail margins, and thereby also the incentive for opportunism, and allow the manufacturer to achieve the vertically integrated prices and pro…t in the market. The results from OS challenge current competition policy as maximum RPM is considered unproblematic everywhere. MS on the other hand, formalize the classic Telser-argument (Telser, 1960) saying that RPM may be e¢ ciency enhancing. In a model with observable contracts MS show that RPM may be e¢ ciency enhancing because it may solve vertical externalities when there are spillovers between retailers from retail sales e¤ort. Both arguments are convincing and intuitive given the setting in which they are developed. OS have secret contracts and no importance of retail sales e¤ort, and MW have public contracts but where retail sales e¤ort matter. The contradicting e¤ects of RPM calls for more uni…ed approach. We think that retail sales e¤ort is of importance in every market. It might be that sales e¤ort is of lesser or bigger importance depending of the product in question, but we think it is really hard to come by an example where retail sales e¤ort is of no importance at all. We also think that in real life markets contracts o¤ered to retailers are basically secret (Katz, 1991) .
We therefore propose a model with secret contracts (where opportunism is an issue) and where retail sales e¤ort is at least of some importance. This model allows us to disentangle the arguments and e¤ects of RPM proposed by OS and MS. Speci…cally, we do this by introducing retail sales e¤ort with spillovers in the framework of OS (or unobservable contracts in the framework of MW). By doing this, new insights emerge.
We show that RPM works dramatically di¤erent in our model than in OS and MW. In fact we show that the RPM mechanisms and e¤ects proposed by both OS and MW totally evaporate once demand depends to any extent of retail sales e¤ort and contracts are secret. We show that purely bilateral price restrictions (as in OS and MW), irrespective of type, have no e¤ect whatsoever on the equilibrium outcome. The monopolist manufacturer will sell at marginal cost, and the equilibrium outcome at the retail level involves Bertrand prices and e¤ort levels as opposed to monopoly prices in OS and monopoly e¤ort levels in MW. Importantly, this result holds irrespective of the importance of retailers'e¤ort as long as it is positive, and irrespective of the type of spillovers in e¤ort. Hence, short of any 'horizontal'agreement that restrict the manufacturer's contracts with rival retailers, there exists no vertical own-sale contracts or (combination of) own-sale restraints that can solve the opportunism problem and provide prices and retail e¤ort above the Bertrand level. With secret contracts, retail sales e¤ort and purely bilateral RPM, irrespective of type, there is no anti-competitive e¤ect and no e¢ ciency e¤ect.
Our next result is that industry-wide RPM, i.e. the practice that a manufacturer commits to a common RPM to all its retailers, may mitigate both problems. We show that with industry-wide RPM, equilibrium retail prices and e¤ort levels can be lifted above the Betrand level. Importantly, to elicit a price increase and to induce retail e¤ort, the price restraint will here have to be introduced as a minimum price (as in MW), not as a maximum price as in OS. However, we show that the manufacturer is generally not able to realize the vertically integrated outcome except in one very special case. This case is when there are no spillovers from sales e¤ort at the retail level.
More generally, industry-wide RPM will have one negative e¤ect -it increases retail prices -and one positive -it may spur retail sales e¤ort. The question then is what is the net e¤ect from this on consumers'surplus. To evaluate the e¤ect on consumers surplus from RPM we use a speci…c utility function to produce our third result. We show that, even if consumers value sales e¤ort, and even if there is freeriding among retailers, the consumers are hurt by a industry-wide price ‡oor. Hence, the policy implication from our analysis is that we …nd no support for the harsh treatment of bilateral price restraints that we see in for instance the EU. Our analysis do however show that when manufacturers may commit to industry-wide RPM, this may be more problematic.
The rest of the papers is organized as follows. The next section brie ‡y reviews the literature related to the opportunism problem under secret contracting and RPM. Then, in Section 3 we present our model, our basic assumptions and our benchmark. Section 4 contains the analysis and presents our main results assuming individual RPM contracts, and in Section 5 we derive our results with industry-wide RPM contracts. Section 6 concludes.
The opportunism problem
The opportunism problem underlying OS is arising when a manufacturer contracts secretly with downstream retailers and has been recognized in the literature for a long time. An upstream manufacturer with market power has an interest of restricting supply to its retailers to preserve its market power which in turn can be shared with the retailers. However, due to secret contracts when contracting with each retailer, the manufacturer has an incentive to free-ride on the margins earned by his other retailers. This incentive has been shown and analyzed by several authors in di¤erent settings 3 . In general, the problem prevents a manufacturer with market power upstream from realizing its market power when selling to downstream retailers. The ‡avour of the problem is similar to the durable good monopolist; the monopolist can not avoid reducing his price. There are evidence suggesting that the problem is perceived as real by retailers. For instance, in a recent EU merger case concerning Unilever and a smaller upstream competitor, the the EU competition authority, DG-Comp, presented evidence where retailers expressed explicit concerns for the opportunism problem. As usual in merger cases in upstream markets, the fear was that the merger would allow the merged entity to increase its prices to retailers. The EU-commission found evidence indicating that retailers across the concerned EU member states "would accept (input)price increases if applied generally in the market" and Unilever presented evidence where "retailers expressed doubts on how they can be sure that Unilever indeed would uniformly increase prices across all customers", indicating the awareness of the opportunism problem among retailers. 4 The essence of the problem can be illustrated with downstream price competition. In this case, when negotiating with each retailer, the manufacturer and each retailer are maximizing their bilateral pro…ts, and thus ignores quasi-rents earned by the other retailers. This induces each retailer and the manufacturer to free-ride on these rents, and in equilibrium they end up setting transfer prices at the manufacturer's marginal cost. There has been several proposals in the literature suggesting how the manufacturer may circumvent the problem. Hart and Tirole (1990) argue that vertical integration may be a way to remonopolize the market. If an upstream monopolistic …rm can vertically integrate with one of several homogeneous retailers, he will have no incentive to supply the unintegrated retailers and the manufacturer can restore the monopoly outcome. Also, as noted by Hart and Tirole (1990) and Rey and Tirole (2006) signing an exclusive dealing contract with one retailer may also solve the problem. However, if retailers serve partially overlapping markets there will be a loss of potential pro…t from selling though a single retailer in the downstream market. In these cases vertical integration and exclusive contracts will generally not be enough to fully solve the problem. As noted above, OS proposed an e¢ cient solution for the manufacturer.
The result that maximum RPM can eliminate opportunism has later been con…rmed also by Rey and Vergé (2004) and Montez (2012) , but in di¤erent settings. Montez (2012) shows that a monopolist producer may eliminate opportunism by using buybacks and (sometimes) a price ceiling. In a similar setting as OS, Rey and Vergé (2004) show that equilibria with wary beliefs (as opposed to passive beliefs as in OS exist and re ‡ect opportunism, and that a maximum RPM with a price squeeze will eliminate the scope for opportunism also in this case. In sum, these papers suggest that a maximum price may be detrimental to consumers because it eliminates the scope for opportunism. We now deveop our model.
The model
We follow OS and consider the classic setup for the opportunism problem with downstream price competition. We have a vertically related industry with an upstream monopolist, M , who produces an intermediate good which he sells to two downstream di¤erentiated retailers, R 1 and R 2 ; using unobservable non-linear contracts. The two retailers transform the manufacturer's good on a one-to-one basis into two symmetrically di¤erentiated …nal goods, and sell them to consumers.
In contrast to OS, but as in MW, retailers may excert sales e¤ort that enhances demand. We denote retailer R i 's demand by D i (e; p), where e = (e 1 ; e 2 ) denotes the vector of the retailers'sales e¤ort, and p = (p 1 ; p 2 ) denotes the vector of retail prices. We will assume that retail demands are symmetric, and for all D i (:) > 0, demand is assumed to be downward sloping in the own-price p i and increasing in own-e¤ort e i , with @ e i D i > 0 and @ e i e i D i 0.
5 For some of our results, we will invoke the following set of assumptions about the retailers'demand (assuming both D i and D j are positive):
A1. All else equal, a uniform increase in p 1 and p 2 causes D i to fall, which implies that
All else equal, a uniform increase in e 1 and e 2 causes D i to rise, which implies that
All else equal, a marginal increase in e i causes total demand to rise,
For any p j , we also assume that there is a choke-price, p i = p (p j ) ; implicitly de…ned by D i (p i ; p j ) = 0, above which demand for good i is zero. Because the retailers are substitutes, we have that
We make no speci…c assumption about the e¤ect of R i 's e¤ort on the rival's demand,
Hence, we allow for both positive, negative and no spillovers in retail e¤ort. We denote the retailer's e¤ort cost by C i = C (e i ), which is assumed to be twice continuously di¤erentiable, with C 0 i (e i ) > 0 and C 00 i (e i ) > 0 8e i > 0, and it is assumed to satisfy the Inada conditions at 0 and 1. We will denote R i 's average e¤ort cost by i = (e i ) := C i =D i : All other retailing costs are assumed to be zero. We assume throughout the analysis that a retailer's sales e¤ort is non-veri…able and hence also non-contractable.
We consider the following simple two-stage game played between the manufacturer and the two retailers: At stage 1 (the contracting stage), the manufacturer makes take-itor-leave-it contract o¤ers T 1 and T 2 simultaneously and secretly to each retailer, which the retailers subsequently either accept or reject. A retailer never observes his rival's contract terms. At stage two (the competition stage), accepted contracts are implemented and retailers compete by simultaneously choosing their prices and e¤ort levels.
A contract T i (:) can take various (non-linear) forms. We will consider three classes of contracts used by M at the contracting stage:
where F i is a …xed fee and w i is a per-unit transfer price. We will denote these contracts by (F i ; w i ) :
2. 'General own-sale contracts'. A (non-linear) contract T i between M and R i is called an own-sale contract if it does not put restrictions on M 's trade relationship (contract) with retailer R j . Own-sale contracts can in general include any restriction or requirement for the quantity resold by R i , and any restriction or requirement for the price that R i is allowed to charge in the downstream market. I.e., own-sale contracts can put restrictions on the buyer's actions in the downstream market but do not put restrictions on the seller's actions vis-a-vis other retailers in the upstream market. Examples of restrictions that can be included in own-sale contracts are individual price ‡oors or ceilings, restrictions on the customers/ geographic area that the retailer is allowed to sell to; restrictions or requirements for the quantity bought or resold (quantity or sales forcing), retroactive discounts, market-share discounts, etc.
3. 'Horizontal contracts'. A (non-linear) contract between M and R i is called a horizontal contract if it puts restrictions on M 's trade relationship (contract) with the rival retailer R j : Examples of this are industry-wide vertical price …xing; any commitments from M to sell exclusively to R i ; agreements that give R i exclusive rights to a speci…c set of consumers or over a speci…c geographic area, non-discrimination clauses, etc. All of these provisions put restrictions on the contract that M can legally o¤er to R j . In Section 5 we will consider industry-wide vertical price restraints.
We let M 's pro…t be given M = P 2 i=1 (T i cD i ), and let R i 's pro…t be given by
To stick as close as possible to OS' original analysis, we will employ the "contract equilibrium" concept formalized by Cremér and Riordan (1987) . De…nition 1. Let A be the set of allowable contracts and s = (s i ) be the vector of retailers strategies in the downstream market. A contract equilibrium with unobservable contracts is then a vector of supply contracts T 2 A, and Nash equilibrium s induced by these contracts, such that 8i and 8T i 2 A, T i is the contract that maximizes the bilateral joint pro…t of M and R i , taking T j ;s j as given. Formally, T 2 A constitutes a contract equilibrium i¤
8i and 8T This equilibrium concept is very simple and tractable. It says that in a contract equilibrium, there is no room for a retailer-manufacturer pair M R i to revise their contract and increase their bilateral joint pro…t, holding …xed M 's contract with R j , and holding …xed R j 's choice of e¤ort and price. A contract equilibrium's de…ning characteristic is therefore that it survives bilateral deviations, i.e. where a pair M R i decides to secretly renegotiate their contract terms.
6 Note that, with restrictions on the set of allowable contracts, there may exist a contract outside the set,
could be enforced by a court, would allow M R i to increase their bilateral joint pro…ts.
Two benchmarks
Under our assumptions on the demand, when marginal transfer prices are constant and equal to M 's marginal cost c, the …nal-stage Bertrand game has a unique equilibrium where both retailers exert the same e¤ort and set the same prices, characterized by fp B ; e B g = arg max
6 As noted by Rey and Vergé (2004) , however, a weakness with contract equilibria is that they do not always survive multilateral deviations, where the manufacturer revises his o¤ers and deviates (secretly) with both retailers simultaneously. Hence, a contract equilibrium does not always constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (with passive beliefs). To avoid the latter, one could imagine a contracting game where the manufacturer uses a pair of agents that simulatenously and independently negotiates contracts with the retailers on the manufacturer's behalf. This would rule out multilateral deviations per construction.
In the following we will refer to fp B ; e B g as the 'standard Bertrand levels of price and ef- the quantity sold and the pro…t earned (gross of any …xed transfers) by each retailer in this standard Bertrand equilibrium. Next, we characterize the outcome when the industry is fully integrated (both vertically and horizontally). The overall industry pro…t can be written
The integrated monopolist's …rst-order conditions for the retail price and sales e¤ort, can be written as
and
We let p 1 = p 2 = p I and e 1 = e 2 = e I denote the prices and e¤ort levels respectively that simultaneously solves the monopolist's …rst order conditions, and denote by I > 2 B the resulting integrated pro…t. We will refer to p I ; e I as the integrated/collusive/monopoly levels of prices and e¤ort.
Analysis and main results
In this section the aim is to analyze the equilibrium outcome when the manufacturer may use general non-linear own-sale contracts and RPM. We start o¤ this section by quickly veryfying that the opportunism problem exist also with demand enhancing e¤ort in the demand function. Then we proceed by investigating the equilibrium outcome under the OS contract assumptions, i.e. allowing general non-linear contracts and RPM. We then expand the set of allowable contracts by investigating any type of 'own-sale'contracts (as de…ned above). We show that there is no contract of this type that is able to mitigate the opportunism problem.
Two-part tari¤s
For completeness, we …rst verify that the opportunism problem persists with two part tari¤s and where the retailers exert some sales e¤ort. Suppose M has o¤ered a contract w j ; F j to R j , and that this contract induces price and e¤ort p j ;e j by R j at the …nal stage. Given this, we can write the retailers'pro…t as
which yields the …rst-order conditions
Then we can show the following result.
Lemma 1. (Two-part tari¤s) There exist a unique contract equilibrium where the marginal wholesale prices (w 1 ; w 2 ) are the same and equal to M 's marginal production cost c.
Proof: see the appendix.
Lemma 1 con…rms the unsurprising result that the opportunism problem that arises with unobservable contracting persists also when the retailers also exert some sales e¤ort downstream.
General own-sale contracts and RPM
We now turn to the situation where M is allowed to use RPM together with more general non-linear contracts. In fact, we allow the manufacturer to impose any restrictions on the retailer's own-sales. Before we move on, we state the following Lemma, which we have adopted from OS' original paper and generalized to a setting that allows for retailers' sales e¤ort Lemma 2. If (T ; s ) forms a contract equilibrium with general own-sale contracts (and RPM), then 8j, T j is continuous and di¤erentiable at the quantity D j induced by (T ; p ). If the contracts entail a commitment to industry-wide price …xing, then the same result holds, as long as there are spillovers in retailers'sales e¤ort.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 2 greatly simpli…es the rest of the analysis, and the intuition for the result is straightforward: First, notice that if T j (D j ) was not continuous at D j = D j , then either a marginal reduction or a marginal increase in D j would cause the payment from R j to M to either jump up or down. This means that either the pair M R i could increase their bilateral joint pro…t by inducing a marginal change in p i (or, with spillovers in e¤ort, by inducing a marginal change in e i ) that would cause T j to jump up, or R j could increase his pro…t through marginal changes in either p j or e j that would cause T j to jump down. For this reason, T j has to be continuous at the equilibrium quantity D j . From this it just remains to show that T j (D j ) also is di¤erentiable at D j = D j , which is shown in the Appendix.
Next, notice that Lemma 2 has implications for what types of vertical restraints M can impose on its retailers in equilibrium. For example, any "sales-forcing" contracts, or contracts that seek to force the retailer to reach a certain market share threshold, would be ine¤ectual. The reason is simply that these tari¤s (per de…nition) would have to jump when deviating slightly from the "forcing"quantity or market-share. Retroactive discounts would be ine¤ectual for exactly the same reason.
When proceeding the analysis, we …rst show that it is impossible for the manufacturer to induce the integrated pro…t I when using general own-sale contracts and RPM.
Lemma 3. (General own-sale contracts) In equilibrium, it is not possible for the manufacturer to induce the integrated pro…t I .
Proof: See the appendix.
The intuition for this result is as follows. To overcome the opportunism problem, the manufacturer has to take into account R j 's quasi-rents when making his contract o¤er to R i , and vice versa. As suggested by OS, one way to do this is to eliminate the retailers' quasi-rents completely. For example, by …xing the retail prices and then squeezing the retailers'mark-ups through high marginal transfer prices. However, to induce the retailers to exert some e¤ort, the retailers have to earn strictly positive quasi-rents on the margin, to cover their marginal e¤ort cost. Because it is not possible for the manufacturer to achieve both simultaneously, the integrated outcome is unattainable. We now show our …rst main result, namely that general own-sale contracts and RPM in fact yield the Bertrand level of prices and e¤ort . Proposition 1. (General own-sale contracts) In all contract equilibria we have that i) the marginal transfer prices are the same for each retailer and equal to the manufacturer's marginal cost c, ii) retail prices are equal to p B , and iii) each retailer's sales e¤ort is equal to e B .
Proposition 1 shows that when there is just a small e¤ect of retailer sales e¤ort on demand, the manufacturer's opportunism problem is restored with full force, and the RPM equilibrium introduced by OS breaks down. The intuition for this is the following: To overcome the temptation to o¤er the retailers sweetheart deals, that would allow a retailer to charge a lower price at its rival's expense, the manufacturer can impose a price ceiling equal to p I and then squeeze the retailers'sales margins by charging high marginal transfer prices, T 0 i ! p I ; i = 1; 2. However, this cannot arise in any contract equilibrium if retailers also can exert some sales e¤ort that would in ‡uence demand. The reason is that, given that the retailers' mark-ups are squeezed, the manufacturer can pro…tably deviate with either retailer and charge it a slightly lower marginal transfer price. The reason is that this would induce the retailer to make (more) sales e¤ort at the last stage of the game. This means that a strategy of squeezing the retailers'margins cannot arise in any contract equilibrium, and that each retailer has to earn strictly positive quasi-rents. This opens the door for opportunism again, and to such an extent that the outcome involves Bertrand prices and e¤ort levels. The intuition for this is exacly the same as for opportunism without retailer sales e¤ort; a positive margin drives the equilibrium all the way down to Bertrand. Note also that Proposition 1 implies that also the equilibrium proposed by MW breaks down once contracts are secret. From Lemma 1 we also know that it does not work to combine RPM with any other own-sale restrictions or tari¤ schemes, such as restrictions on the retailer's customer base, sales forcing, market-share contracts, retroactive discounts, etc. A striking feature of the result in Proposition 1 is that the smallest e¤ect of retail service on consumer demand shifts the equilibrium outcome from one extreme to the other, i.e. from the vertically integrated outcome as in OS, to the Bertrand outcome. This is surprising, as one might have expected that by introducing some e¤ect of sales e¤ort one would end up somewhere between the vertically integrated outcome and Bertrand.
In the next section we check the robustness of the result in Proposition 1. We do so by allowing the manufacturer to impose industry-wide RPM (i.e to commit to the same RPM clause to both retailers in our setting).
Horizontal contracts
Intuitively, the reason why general own-sale contracts cannot be used to curtail opportunism and induce higher prices, is that these contracts do not restrict the type of o¤ers the manufacturer can (legally) make to rival retailers. Hence, imposing individual price ceilings and then squeezing the retailers' margins, for example, does not work because the manufacturer is allowed to secretly o¤er one of the retailers a lower marginal transfer price -which in turn would induce that retailer to make some sales e¤ort downstream and increase her joint pro…t with the manufacturer. In turn this deviation provides an incentive to deviate on the resale prices as well, and the opportunism problem reappears.
Horizontal restraints, such as industry-wide RPM, on the other hand, may work, because these contracts (by de…nition) restricts the set of contracts that the manufacturer can establish with rival retailers. We now analyze whether a commitment to industry-wide RPM may help the manufacturer fully restore the …rst-best outcome.
Industry-wide price …xing
Industry-wide vertical price …xing describes a situation where the manufacturer is able to commit to adopting a common resale price throughout the downstream market. We can model this by incorporating a stage prior to the contracting stage, where the manufacturer commits publicly to an industry-wide resale price to be imposed on both of its retailers, before negotiating transfer prices privately and secretly with each retailer at stage 2. 
Proof: See the appendix
With an industry-wide resale price equal to p set by the manufacturer at the …rst stage of the game, the unique Nash equilibrium at the …nal stage therefore has each retailer exerting sales e¤ort equal to e (p) (De…nition 2). The manufacturer's optimal industrywide resale price in this game is therefore characterized by
We then have the following result.
Proposition 2. (Industry-wide RPM) If the manufacturer can commit to an industrywide resale price he is able to induce the pro…t S I as de…ned in De…nition 2. S = I if and only if there are no spillovers in equilibrium, and S < I otherwise. To induce a price increase, the price restraint will have to be a …xed price or a price ‡oor.
The intuition is as follows. Each retailer will only take into account the e¤ect of its sales e¤ort on its own demand. Hence, when facing a marginal transfer price equal to the true marginal cost of the manufacturer, and the manufacturer …xes the retail price at the integrated level p I ; each retailer will provide too little service with positive spillovers and too much service when spillovers are negative. Hence, p S = p I and e S = e I cannot both hold when there are spillovers in e¤ort.
Without spillovers in sales e¤ort, on the other hand, allowing for industry-wide RPM fully restores the manufacturer's ability to induce the integrated outcome: The manufacturer can then commit to the integrated price p I at the …rst stage of the game, and marginal transfer prices equal to c -which characterizes the unique equilibrium at the contracting stage -and this is su¢ cient to induce each retailer to exert the integrated level of sales e¤ort e I at the …nal stage.
Note also that S 2 B has to hold, because the manufacturer could always replicate the outcome 2 B by committing to the standard Bertrand price p B at the …rst stage.
Moreover, we may also note that to elicit a price increase relative to the Betrand outcome, the industry-wide resale price would have to be introduced either as a …xed price or as a price ‡oor -it cannot be a price ceiling as in OS. The reason is that all contract equilibria are again characterized by marginal cost pricing for the manufacturer's product. Hence, a minimum or …xed price p > p B is needed to prevent retailers from charging the standard Bertrand price at the …nal stage. Therefore, according to our analysis, minimum or …xed RPM may be harmful in some cases -especially when the e¤ect of sales e¤ort is relatively small and insigni…cant -whereas maximum RPM is never harmful in this case.
To provide a sense for the potential welfare implications of allowing for an industrywide price ‡oor in our setting, we will evaluate consumers'welfare using a commonly used representative utility function 8 .
where A i = (2 + (1 + )) e i + (2 + (1 + )) e j ; i 6 = j 2 f1; 2g and 2 [0; 1] is a measure for spillovers in e¤ort provision. I.e., we consider here positive spillovers only, but of a varying degree. Y is consumers'income, q i is the quantity purchased by the consumer from retailer i 2 f1; 2g ; and 2 [0; 1) is a measure for the substitutability between retailers. Note that when e 1 = e 2 = 0; U yields Shubik-Levitan (1980) demand functions. Finally, we assume that the retailers' e¤ort cost is given by
i =2, i = 1; 2; where > 1. By comparing the representative consumer's net utility when retailers set the standard Bertrand prices and e¤ort levels p B ; e B , with the consumer's net utility under industrywide RPM and e¤ort levels p S ; e S , we get the following result.
Proposition 3. Given the utility function U , consumer surplus always falls when we allow the manufacturer to commit to an industry-wide price ‡oor.
This result is potentially important, because it challenges the claim that -in a setting where retailers freeride on each other's service provisions -price ‡oors create e¢ ciencies that ultimately bene…t the end consumers. This claim is based on the earlier literature that investigates the manufacturer's rationale for using vertical restraints (e.g., RPM) in a game with perfect information (e.g. Mathewson and Winter, 1984) . The crucial assumption that di¤erentiates the results in this literature from ours, is the assumption that the manufacturer can commit to a set of public contracts. In MW the manufacturer in ‡ates retail margins by subsidizing the retailers with wholesale price below the manufacturer's marginal cost. This will spur the retailers to provide retail sales e¤ort. However, with unobservable contracts, the opportunism problem locks the marginal wholesale prices to marginal costs, and instead the manufacturer in ‡ates the margins by increasing the minimum resale price. In fact here the price is raised to such an extent that retail prices are set above the monopoly price for a given level of e¤ort. Motta (2004) use this utility function, but in model with observable contracts. In his book Motta shows that price ‡oors in that case always increase both consumer and overall welfare. On the other hand, our proposition states that if the manufacturer can commit to a common price ‡oor for both retailers, and that retailers otherwise do not have information about rivals'contract terms, the result in Motta is turned around; consumers then always lose when we allow the manufacturer to commit to a set of minimum prices. However, on an intuitive level the welfare implications for consumers may depend on how demand reacts to retailers'e¤ort. It might be that if e¤ort is critical for generating consumer demand (unlike the utility function speci…ed above), then we should be open to that consumers'surplus may increase with public price ‡oors. That could for instance be the case if very little retail e¤ort would be provided without the publicly observable price restraint (i.e., when competition is very …erce).
To sum up, the analysis above shows that in a setting where retailers provide valuable services, consumers will lose when we allow for a publicly imposed price ‡oor, given that the retailers'contract terms are otherwise unobservable.
Conclusion
The received literature on the use of resale price restraints has produced results that show that RPM may be anti-competitive and lead to increased prices to consumers, but also that RPM may be bene…cial because it may induce more retail sales e¤ort. These results have been derived either in models with secret contracts and no retail sales e¤ort, or with public contracts and where retail sales e¤ort are important. In most real life markets we have argued that retail sales e¤ort are at least of some importance, and also that contracts in most cases are secret. In this paper we have proposed a unifying approach where both these central ingredients are present. This leads to new insights.
We have shown that purely bilateral price restraints, irrespective of type, have no implication whatsoever on the equilibrium outcome. Bilateral price restraints can not be used neither for anti-competitive, nor for e¢ ciency purposes, e.g. to induce retail sales e¤ort. In equilibrium the standard Bertrand prices and e¤ort levels prevail. Next we have shown that if manufacturers can commit to industry-wide price ‡oors, the manufacturer can obtain higher prices and e¤ort levels, but he will generally not be able to achieve the …rst-best collusive outcome. Hence, the claim from Mathewson and Winter (1984) that minimum RPM is bene…cial for e¤ort provision has some merit, but it comes at the cost of increased retail prices. We show that that retail prices in fact will be higher than the monopoly prices for a given e¤ort level, and in sum consumers'surplus is hurt.
The anticompetitive argument for RPM with secret contracts is based on the idea that a maximum RPM coupled with high marginal wholesale prices can solve the manufacturer's opportunism problem. On a general level, we have shown that the opportunism problem arising from contract unobservability in vertical relations may be signi…cant harder to solve than has been recognized in the literature before. Speci…cally, the result that maximum RPM mitigates opportunism, as proposed by O'Brien and Sha¤er (1992) , breaks down once retail demand depends to any extent of service provided at the retail level. Since the basic problem stems from positive margins at the retail level, and the intrinsic temptation to free-ride on the margins, OS's solution simply was to eliminate these margins by using maximum RPM and high transfer prices. This is true if retail service has no impact whatsoever on retail demand. If retail sales e¤ort only has a minimal e¤ect on demand this equilibrium breaks down, as the manufacturer would wish to lower its transfer price to each retailer, inducing higher sales. Positive margins, in turn, completely reopens the door for opportunism again, and returns the outcome to Bertrand prices and e¤ort levels. We have shown that when retail service has any positive impact on demand, and for any size and sign of spillovers from such activity, then there are no own-sale contracts that will solve the opportunism problem.
Our results con…rm that, generally purely bilateral, vertical contracts cannot solve the manufacturer's opportunism problem. To fully restore the integrated outcome, the manufacturer's contract with one retailer would have to be (indirectly) contingent on the price set, and the quantity sold, by rival retailers, and vice versa. I.e., the contracts need to include a credible horizontal commitment from the manufacturer, and this may be di¢ cult to implement in practice.
One solution that has been proposed in the literature, is for the manufacturer to condition each retailer's contract terms explicitly on the terms o¤ered to rival retailers -e.g., through non-discrimination or most-favoured customer clauses (MFC). This requires the actual marginal wholesale terms of rival retailers to be veri…able in court. However, given the widespread practice in many industries of negotiating secret, "backroom" discounts that do not show up on the retailers'invoices, it is reasonable to assume that the actual wholesale terms are at least di¢ cult to verify.
Other industry-wide practices, such as price …xing agreements, may be a more viable solution, e.g. when facilitated through industry trade agreements. The latter we have seen implemented in European book markets, e.g. in Spain, France and Germany. Yet, in general, even these types of horizontal agreements will not su¢ ce to implement the …rst-best as long as the rest of the contract terms are individually negotiated. With di¤erentiated retailers as in our model, it also follows that the integrated outcome cannot be achieved through exclusion of retailers.
As noted above, competition policy in many countries tends to be more hostile against minimum of …xed RPM than maximum RPM. In fact, in most jurisdictions maximum RPM is regarded as unproblematic. Several recent articles has challenged this view by showing that also maximum RPM may be detrimental to consumers (Montez, 2012; O'Brien and Sha¤er, 1992; Rey and Vergé, 2004) . They all suggest that maximum RPM may be detrimental to consumers because it is an instrument to solve the opportunism problem. An important policy implication from our analysis is that this suggestion is not very robust. If retail demand depends to any extent of retail sales e¤ort, maximum RPM has no e¤ect on the outcome. Another importnat policy implication is that bilateral vertical price restraints, irrespective of its type, are harmless for consumers. Industry-wide price ‡oors on the other hand, are detrimental for consumers.
Substituting (6) and (7) into (11), and simplifying, gives the following necessary conditions for (F ; w ; p ; e ) to form a contract equilibrium:
We can rewrite (12) using matrix notation as (w c) D d = 0, where w = (w 1 ; w 2 ), c = (c; c) and
Note that, if consumer demand is una¤ected by retailers'e¤ort, as is the setting in OS' original model, then D d reduces to a 2-by-2 matrix of demand derivatives with respect to prices only. By assumptions A1-A4, D d is always invertible. By assumptions A1-A2, contract equilibria with w 1 = w 2 > c or w 1 = w 2 < c, do not exist. By assumptions A1-A4, the contract equilibrium with w 1 = w 2 = c is unique.Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. The following proof follows closely the proof in O'Brien and Sha¤er (1992), which we have modi…ed to encompass both retailers'sales e¤ort and RPM.
The proof consists of three steps.
Step 1. For all j 6 = i 2 f1; 2g, T j (D j ) is continuous at the quantity induced by T .
Proof. Let D j be the quantity induced by T , and suppose that T j (D j ) were not continuous at D j . Then for some in…nitesimal change in D j , T j would either jump up or jump down. It cannot jump down, because retailer j could then adjust his e¤ort by a small amount and induce a discrete reduction in its payment. It cannot jump up, for then M and R i could jointly adjust p i and/ or e i , and induce a discrete jump in their bilateral pro…ts. Hence, T j must be continuous at D j . Q.E.D.
Step 2 Proof. From step 1, we know that T j has both a left-hand (-) and a right-hand (+) derivative at D j . Retailer j's …rst-order conditions for optimal e¤ort then requires that
using the fact that @ e j D j > 0. Together, (A1) and (A2) yields T 0 j+ T 0 j as a necessary condition for retailer optimality. Q.E.D.
Step 3. The function T j (D j ) satis…es T 0 j T 0 j+ for all j 6 = i 2 f1; 2g ; when evaluated at
Proof. In every contract equilibrium with general own-sale contracts and RPM, the M 's contract with R i per de…nition solves
This yields the following …rst-order conditions for the price p i :
Together with step 1, this implies that T 0 j = T 0 j+ for the contracts to be bilateral best responses with general own-sale contracts and RPM.
The rest of the proof considers the case where deviations on the price are not possible (i.e., the case of industry-wide price …xing). Note …rst that, even though M cannot deviate with R i on the price p i , as is the case with an industry-wide resale price p , M 's contract with R i still has to solve
The case without spillovers is trivial and not important to our results. In the following we therefore consider only the cases with negative and positive spillovers, respectively. With negative spillovers, the …rst-order conditions for (A6) are
Together, (A4) and (A5) yield the condition
With positive spillovers, the …rst-order conditions for (A6) are
Together, (A9) and (A10) yield the condition
The proof is completed by noting that steps 2 and 3 together imply that T 0 j = T 0 j+ when evaluated at D j = D j , both for the case with general own-sale contracts and RPM, and for the case with general non-linear contracts, industry-wide price …xing and spillovers in e¤ort. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3.
Because the manufacturer can use RPM, he is free to use T i to induce the right level of e¤ort e i . Hence, we can think of the pair M R i as choosing both p i and e i directly at the contracting stage. In any contract equilibrium (T ; s ), p i and e i must solve 
which is identical to condition (17) above. Hence, in all contract equilibria, the marginal transfer prices are again equal to the manufacturer's marginal cost c. Importantly, this result is independent of the industry-wide resale price chosen by M at the …rst stage of the game. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
From Lemma 4 we have that the marginal transfer prices will be set equal to manufacturer marginal cost c: Suppose the industry-wide resale price is set to the integrated level p I : Then the …rst-order condition for retailer i is 
